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Manslaughter is one of the few crimes the commission or non-
commission of which may be dependent upon the actor's motivating
beliefs. Where those beliefs are regarded as reasonable, conduct aris-
ing from them which would otherwise amount to manslaughter may be
regarded as noncriminal. The criminal law's concern over belief, or
motive, in this area is striking when compared to the usual criminal
situation-armed robbery, for example, is criminal despite the fact that
the actor may feature himself a modern-day Robin Hood.1
What factors bear on the question of reasonableness of a belief?
Certainly public acceptance is important; as a belief becomes wide-
spread and held by a substantial segment of society, it becomes easier
to accept that belief as reasonable. But judicial and legislative recog-
nition of a belief as a permissible one also plays a part-and on
occasion a crucial one. For example, judicial and legislative recog-
nition of a belief, action upon which has resulted in the death of
another, may influence the course of a prosecution for that death
through the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion. The prosecutor
may decide that the prosecution is contrary to a public policy enunciated
in legislative acts and court decisions, or that it smacks of unfairness
because those statutes and decisions indicated to the actor that his belief
was reasonable and that action upon it would be noncriminal. Or
it may influence a jury-a belief which has apparent legislative and
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1 Two familiar law school cases may serve to illustrate these introductory remarks.
In the first, Rex v. Esop, 7 Car. & P. 456, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1836), a foreign sailor
whose vessel had docked at an English port committed sodomy while aboard the ship;
the court stated that the defendant could be convicted of that offense despite his belief,
based on the laws of his native land, that such conduct was not criminal. Here the
erroneous belief concerned the substance of the law; seldom in such cases does our
legal system concern itself with belief. The second case, Rex v. Machekequonabe, 28
Ont. 309 (Can. Div. Ct. 1897), resulted in a conviction of manslaughter where an
Indian, believing a shadowy figure to be an evil spirit, shot at the "spirit' and killed
his father-in-law. Here the erroneous belief was a factual one and it.is at this point
that the law concerns itself with the reasonableness of the belief.
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judicial sanction is difficult to regard as unreasonable. And eventually
previous judicial and legislative acceptance of a belief may be reflected
in the criminal laws themselves-either through judicial decision based
on considerations of legal consistency or through explicit legislative act.
The gradual judicial, legislative, and social acceptance of a belief
has been illustrated in the development and spread of Christian Science
and other less well known forms of spiritual healing. But a remaining
question-and one especially important to those who practice spiritual
healing-is whether belief in the healing effects of prayer has been so
far accepted that a death resulting from failure to secure medical aid
because of that religious conviction does not constitute involuntary
manslaughter.
The question of whether religious belief is a defense to a man-
slaughter prosecution based on failure to provide medical attention for
a dependent child recently has been raised again after a lapse of several
decades.2 In 1956 Mr. and Mrs. Edward Cornelius were indicted for
involuntary manslaughter in Pennsylvania ' following the death of their
infant son from diabetes. Both parents were Christian Scientists 4
and, interpreting the teachings of the Bible' as conferring the power
and duty to rely solely on spiritual means for healing, believed that
healing takes place by the action and power of God and that all sickness,
however serious, can be healed by spiritual means alone.6
The case affected the legal right of all Pennsylvania members of
the Christian Science Church, a substantial and well-established faith,7
2 Research yields no case concerning failure to supply medical aid as a result of
medical beliefs since Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. County Ct. 56 (1915). See the
discussion of this case at notes 53-54 infra and accompanying text. Since the Cornelius
indictment, one somewhat similar case has arisen in Maryland. See notes 43-48 infra
and accompanying text
3 Involuntary manslaughter, a common-law crime in Pennsylvania, is defined as
follows: "'Involuntary manslaughter consists in the killing of another without malice
and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor
naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some
act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty."' Common-
wealth v. Root, 191 Pa. Super. 238, 242, 156 A.2d 895, 898-99 (1959). The Cor-
nelius indictment was based on an alleged failure to perform a legal duty.
4At the time of the indictment Mr. and Mrs. Cornelius were 37 and 33 years of
age respectively. Both had been taught to rely on Christian Science since their
earliest recollections and both were active members of First Church of Christ,
Scientist, Swarthmore, Pa., and also of The Mother Church, The First Church of
Christ, Scientist, in Boston.
5 These teachings include the command of Christ, as related in Matt. 10:8, to
"Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils . .. ."
6The Cornelius case presented no issue as to the sincerity of the defendants'
religious convictions. The defendants used the help of a Christian Science practitioner
and, when their son failed to respond as they had hoped, placed him in a Christian
Science nursing home in Philadelphia. There was no question that everything the
defendants did in connection with their son's illness was in good faith, carefully con-
sidered, and based on deep religious convictions.
7The Mother Church and the main offices of the Church are in Boston. There
are about 3,200 Christian Science churches throughout the world, of which 2,412 are
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to apply the tenets of their religion in ministering to the ills of their
minor children. Aside from its legal significance to this group, it was
attended by extensive publicity because of its emotional impact upon
the public. It brought into sharp focus the question whether there
has been such acceptance in Pennsylvania law of healing by spiritual
means alone that it is a permissible healing art on which parents are
entitled to rely.
EARLY ENGLISH CASES
At Common Law
At common law there was a division of authority on the question
of whether a religious belief was a defense in a prosecution for man-
slaughter based upon failure to provide medical attention for a de-
pendent child. No English court was faced with this question until
the last half of the nineteenth century, when a series of indictments was
entered against members of a religious sect calling themselves the
"Peculiar People." One of the tenets of this religion was reliance on
Providence in cases of illness rather than summoning medical help.
The first case involving the Peculiar People, Regina v. Wag-
staffe,8 arose in 1868. The court, in charging the jury, distinguished
between the denial of food based on religious belief and a denial of
medical treatment for similar reasons. It said that in the former case
a jury could "stamp the conduct with the imputation of gross and
culpable negligence" ' because the belief might be so absurd that it
could not have been honestly obtained, in which event the pretense of
acting for the best would be removed from the case.1" With regard to
medical treatment, however, the court stated that it was an open
question as to whether the defendants were guilty of culpable negli-
gence: "At different times people had come to different conclusions as
in the United States and 83 in Pennsylvania. Each church conducts Sunday School,
regular Sunday services, and also Wednesday night meetings at which testimonials
of healings are recounted. The church, through one of its agencies, publishes a
widely circulated daily newspaper, the Christian Science Monitor. It also sponsors
a Sunday morning television broadcast, and a radio broadcast in which actual verified
accounts of healings are given by persons who have experienced them. Throughout
the country Christian Science churches maintain thousands of reading rooms for the
benefit of the public and the circulation of Christian Science literature, including
monthly and weekly periodicals containing verified testimonies of healings through
Christian Science. Throughout the world, there are approximately 10,000 Christian
Science practitioners whose function is to assist in healing by spiritual means alone.
In addition, there are fifteen Christian Science nursing homes in the United States,
including the one in Philadelphia to which the Cornelius child was sent for care.
8 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868).
9Id. at 533.
10 Compare Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884), where the defendant,
holding himself out as a physician, was convicted of manslaughter when his patient
died after being bound in kerosene-soaked flannel as the defendant had prescribed.
19601
206 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.109:203
to what might be done with a sick person." "1 A verdict of not guilty
was returned. The report of the Wagstaffe case consists solely of the
vaguely worded charge which, in effect, left to the jury a determination
of whether the religious belief held by the defendants was reasonable.
It should be noted, however, that later writers have accepted Wagstaffe
as the authoritative statement of the common-law rule."
Two other cases 13 were decided after the passage of the Poor Law
Amendment Act of 1868,1" but reference to the new statute was
omitted and common-law principles apparently were applied. No
written opinion is reported in the first case, Regina v. Hurry,'5 except
for the fact that the defendant was convicted of unlawfully neglecting
to provide medical aid to his child. 6 In the other case a member of
the Peculiar People was indicted for "unlawfully endangering the life
of his child" who had died of pneumonia. The trial judge, in directing
a verdict of acquittal, spoke in terms of there being "no culpable omis-
sion of duty" where a parent has dealt with his child "by nursing and
care instead of calling in a doctor to apply blisters, leeches and
calomel ... ." "
Under Statutes Protecting Dependent Children
Few other English judges were given an opportunity to rule on
the religious belief problem under common law. Within six months
1110 Cox Crim. Cas. at 533.
12 The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, for example, cites the case
as its sole authority for the following statement: "Under the common law no con-
viction of manslaughter predicated upon an omission to provide medical attendance
from conscientious motives has been reported, and none can probably be had or
sustained. Opinions have widely differed in all ages as to the proper mode of minister-
ing to the sick, and in the absence of a statute declaring it a positive duty upon a
parent to call in a medical practitioner the omission to do so can scarcely be considered
negligence so gross and wanton as to be criminal when the fact is admitted that the
defendant acted in all good faith, doing the best he could according to his lights."
21 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw 199 (2d ed. 1902). And in 1
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 462 (12th ed. 1932), this statement appears: "Where
from a conscientious conviction that God would heal the sick, and not from any
intention to avoid the performance of their duty, the parents of a sick child refuse
to call in medical assistance, though well able to do so, and the child consequently
died, this was held at common law not to be culpable homicide." In addition to
Wagstaffe, Wharton cites Regina v. Hines, 80 Cent. Crim. Ct. 309 (1874).
13 Regina v. Hines, supra note 12; Regina v. Hurry, 76 Cent. Crim. Ct. 63 (1872).
14 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, § 37. See the discussion of this statute at notes 18-21
infra and accompanying text.
15 76 Cent. Crim. Ct. 63 (1872).
16 That the indictment was framed in terms of unlawfully neglecting to provide
medical aid may indicate that the case was tried under the Poor Law Amendment
Act, rather than under purely common-law principles. However, no specific mention
of the statute is made in the report of the case. Additional support for the view that
the case was tried under common-law principles is found in the prosecutor's statement
in Regina v. Downes, L.R. 1 Q.B. 25, 29 (1875) : "The authorities are not in harmony
as to whether this conviction could be sustained at Common Law. The ruling of
Byles, J., in Reg. v. Hurry is clearly in favour of it, while those of Willes, J., in
Reg. v. Wagstaffe, and Piggott, B., in Reg. v. Hines, tend the other way."
17 Regina v. Hines, 80 Cent. Crim. Ct. 309, 312 (1874).
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after the Wagstaffe case, and obviously as a result of that decision,
Parliament added the words "medical aid" to the Poor Law Amend-
ment Act of 1868."8 After this amendment, the act provided that
"when any Parent shall willfully neglect to provide adequate Food,
Clothing, Medical Aid, or Lodging for his child . . . whereby the
Health of such Child shall have been . . injured, he shall be guilty
of an Offense .... "
In Regina v. Downes,9 it was held that the new statute sub-
jected parents to criminal liability for failure to provide medical treat-
ment regardless of the fact that the failure was based on religious
belief. This holding has been unchallenged in subsequent cases arising
under the 1868 statute and under its more recent and more pervasive
counterpart, the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933.20 Two of
the judges in Downes, however, doubted that the conviction could have
been sustained without the aid of the statute.21
In 1894 the Poor Law Amendment Act was repealed by the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 2 which provided merely that
anyone who had in his custody or care a child under the age of sixteen
years and who wilfully neglected such child in a manner which was
likely to cause it unnecessary suffering or injury was guilty of a mis-
demeanor. The change in wording, however, had little effect on the
results of subsequent cases tried under the statute.
In the first reported case 23 under the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children Act, the jury was told that it must find the defendants guilty
if it believed that the absence of medical treatment accelerated the death
of their child. The judge charged that it did not matter that the de-
fendants had thought they were doing right and warned the jury not
to be carried away by any sympathies for conscientious objections.
A more significant case which arose under the act is Queen v.
Senior.2" There, the trial judge charged both in terms of common-law
gross and wanton negligence 25 and also under the misdemeanor-man-
1831 & 32 Vict. c. 122, § 37.
19 L.R. 1 Q.B. 25 (1875).
20 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(2) (a).
21 Lord Coleridge, who delivered the prevailing opinion, had this to say of the
common-law rule: "[HIad it not been for the statute . . . I should have enter-
tained great doubt upon this case; for, apart from the argument founded upon the
statute, I think the observations in the cases cited before Willes, J., [Wagstaffe] and
Piggott, B., [Hines] are deserving of the greatest consideration." L.R. 1 Q.B. at 29.
And in concurring, Bramwell, B., said: "I agree with my Lord Coleridge as to the
difficulty which would have existed had it not been for the statute." L.R. 1 Q.B. at 30.
22 57 & 58 Vict. c. 41.
23 Regina v. Cook, 62 J.P. 712 (1898).
24 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283.
28 See id. at 285: "In order to make out a case of manslaughter by negligence in
a case of this kind purely at common law, the negligence must be gross and wanton,
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slaughter rule." The defendant was convicted and the conviction was
upheld by the Court of Appeals, with the trial judge in Wagstaffe, then
sitting on the appellate court, concurring in the result."
The numerically meager and substantively divided English cases
provide no clear answer as to whether religious belief was a defense
to manslaughter prosecutions grounded on a failure to provide medical
care. The majority of purely common-law cases supports the view
that conscientiously held belief was a defense; but where some statute
imposed an affirmative duty to provide medical aid to dependent chil-
dren, or merely made criminal the neglect of such persons, the English
courts had little trouble striking down a defense based on religious
convictions.
AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS
The Early Cases
In American jurisdictions, cases involving religious belief as a
defense to a criminal prosecution for failure to provide medical as-
sistance to minors also have been scarce. The first significant prosecu-
tions in which a defense of religious conviction was raised were brought
shortly after the turn of the present century. In State v. Sandford,"
the leader of a religious community which believed in and practiced
faith healing was convicted of manslaughter as a result of the death
of a member of that community. He was charged with failing to
provide medical care and food, the latter apparently as a result of a
religious fast. The trial court charged the jury that an omission to
provide medical care as a result of a belief in faith healing did not
provide the basis for a conviction of manslaughter, but that criminal
negligence existed if the defendant failed to act according to his beliefs
in the efficacy of prayerful healing and such failure hastened death.
The conviction was reversed on the grounds that the last portion of
the charge made the causation problem dependent on the beliefs of the
so much as to indicate something, at all events, of an evil mind, and that it was
impossible to say that of the prisoner, who was shown to have spared neither expense
nor care, and to have taken, in all respects but one, every precaution to do the best
for the child."
26The trial judge stated that if the defendant had done something expressly
forbidden by statute and by so doing had caused or accelerated the child's death, he
would be guilty of manslaughter. See [1899] 1 Q.B. at 285.
27This concurrence is especially interesting inasmuch as the opinion contained
the following dictum: "I wish to add that I dissent entirely from the view attributed
to Piggott, B., in Reg. v. Hines (1), and I am not satisfied that in the present case
there was not sufficient evidence, at common law, to justify a conviction." [1899] 1
Q.B. at 292. The Hines case reached a result similar to that in Wagstaffe.
28 99 Me. 441, 59 Atl. 597 (1905).
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jury as to the healing effects of prayer.29  The court approved the
former portion of the charge accepting reliance on faith healing as a
defense.
In State v. Chenowith,30 the defendant was charged with man-
slaughter following the death of his infant son from bronchopneumonia.
The father had called in an "elder" and had resorted to prayer for the
treatment of his son. Though acquitting the defendant on procedural
grounds, the court said in dictum that religious beliefs constitute no
defense to a manslaughter prosecution predicated on the failure of a
parent to give medical assistance to his child,3 and the case has been
cited for that proposition. 2
At about the same time as Sandford and Chenowith, two cases-
People v. Pierson3 and Owens v. State 34-arose in New York and
Oklahoma respectively, under statutes similar to the Poor Law
Amendment Act of 1868.'5 Both statutes made it a misdemeanor
wilfully to omit to furnish medical attendance to a minor. 6 In both
cases the defense of religious belief in faith healing was raised and
rejected, the courts stating that religious convictions are not a defense
to a duty imposed by law. While the statute involved in the Oklahoma
case remains the same today, 7 the New York statute has been amended
significantly to provide that "this article shall not be construed to deny
the right of a parent . . . to treat . . . an ill minor in accordance
with the religious tenets of any church as authorized by other statutes
of this state, provided: That the laws, rules, and regulations relating to
communicable diseases and sanitary matters are not violated." 38
29 The distinction between allowing the beliefs of the jury to be determinative
of the causation issue and allowing those beliefs to determine whether the defendant's
religious conviction was reasonable should be noted. To allow the jury to pass on
causation under the charge in question would have required a decision as to the
efficacy of healing by prayer; in fact, under the charge as given, no conviction could
have been had unless the jury believed that faith healing was efficacious. On the
other hand, to present the jury with the issue of whether the defendant's belief was
reasonable requires no such decision on the soundness of faith healing. Here, the
court apparently decided the reasonableness issue as a matter of law and then pro-
ceeded to give its unusual instructions on the issue of causation.
30 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904).
31 Id. at 99, 71 N.E. at 199.
32 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 n.13 (1944).
33 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
34 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911).
35 See notes 14, 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
36 N.Y. PEN. LAWS § 482; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (1951).
37 A case similar to Owens arose in 1925 under the Oklahoma statute but a
defense predicated on religious beliefs was not raised, presumably because of the
previous ruling in Owens. The court specifically noted its adherence to the prior
case. Beck v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 Pac. 495 (1925).
38 N.Y. PEN. LAWS § 495. Cf. the pertinent New Jersey statute, which reads:
"The provisions of this act shall not be c6nstrued to deny treatment by spiritual
means or prayer, of any child, in accordance with the religious faith of the parent
1960]
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In 1902 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a statute of that
state which made it a misdemeanor to deprive a child of "necessary
sustenance" could not provide the basis for a prosecution for failure
to provide medicine, medicine not being included within the definifion
of "sustenance." " The defendant father claimed that his religious
beliefs forbade him from providing medication but the court did not
pass on the validity of this defense.
In 1920 a Florida court ruled that the statutory definition of
manslaughter did not encompass a death resulting from a failure to
provide medical attention." The defendant was the father of an
epileptic child who, while seized with a paroxysm, had fallen into a
fire and suffered severe burns. As a result of his religious beliefs the
father did not treat the burns with medication. In contrast, a Tennes-
see court the previous year had overruled the quashing of an indictment
predicated on a father's omission to provide medical attention for his
child.41  The Tennessee court cited Queen v. Senior42 with approval
although there was no mention of a defense based on religious
convictions.
Craig v. State
In 1959 the religious belief issue again was raised, this time
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Craig v. State." The
defendants were indicted and convicted of involntary manslaughter
following the death of their six-months-old daughter from pneumonia.
Being members of the Church of God,44 the parents did not utilize
medical assistance but did treat their daughter in accordance with the
tenets of their faith. On appeal, the court, though concluding that a
specific statutory duty to provide medical care existed,45 reversed the
or parents of such child. The provisions of this act shall not be construed to authorize
or empower the State Board of Child Welfare to compel a child to undergo medical
or surgical treatment, if the child, or parent or guardian of said child, objects thereto
in a signed statement upon the ground that the proposed action interferes with the
free exercise of his religious principles." N.J. REv. STAT. § 30:4C-6(a) (Supp. 1959).
39 Justice v. State, 116 Ga. 605, 42 S.E. 1013 (1902).
40 Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920). The court alternatively held
that there was no showing that the defendant's omission was the proximate cause of
the child's death.
41 State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212 S.W. 100 (1919).
42 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text
43 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
4 4 The religion of the defendants is not made clear in the reported decision;
however, independent investigation of the facts of the case indicates that the defend-
ants were not Christian Scientists and that the treatment used was not Christian
Science treatment. In the advanced stages of the infants illness, an attempt was made
to utilize Christian Science practitioners.
45 The court reached this conclusion on the basis of a Maryland statute which
charges parents with the duty of "support, care, nurture, welfare and education" of
their minor children. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1957).
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conviction and remanded for retrial on the issue of proximate cause.
The court stated that if the parents showed a wanton and reckless dis-
regard for the child's life by omitting medical care during that period
of the illness when medical assistance, if given, would have been effec-
tive to prevent death, the omission would constitute the proximate
cause of death. That religious convictions were the basis for the
omission of medical care, the court said, is "beside the point." 11
In remanding the Craig case, the Maryland court considered and
rejected claims of constitutional protection derived from freedom of
religion, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws. In
discussing the claim of freedom of religion, the court stated that the
freedom to believe is separate from the freedom to act and that action
is subject to regulation in the interests of the health and welfare of
the community4 In the case of a Christian Scientist, however, an
integral part of his creed is belief in healing by spiritual means. Thus,
to deny to a Christian Scientist the right to act in accord with his
religion is in effect to deny him his religion. This particularly inter-
esting question of the boundaries of religious freedom under the first
amendment and under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was not presented in these terms in Craig, which, as has been
noted, did not involve Christian Scientists.
The court also rejected the claim that the Maryland statute requir-
ing that medical treatment be given to minors was vague and indefinite
as applied to defendants. And, finally, the argument was made and
rejected that a statute which exempts Christian Science practitioners 48
from the requirement of obtaining a medical practice license allowed
Christian Scientists to pursue their faith but denied that right to de-
fendants, thus violating the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
of the laws. The court stated that the statute in question merely per-
mitted Christian Science practitioners to give treatment but did not
make such treatment the legal equivalent of medical care.
The only conclusion which can be reached from a consideration
of cases arising in American jurisdictions is that the problem has been
little considered and no single doctrine has been established. Different
46 220 Md. at 598, 155 A.2d at 689.
4 71n its elaboration of this point, the court relied principally on Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878), and People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68
N.E. 243 (1903). In Reynolds, the beliefs of the Mormon church were advanced as
a defense to a bigamy prosecution. The court emphasized that bigamy had always
been considered odious and illegal in Western Europe and that it was impossible to
believe that the first amendment was intended to prohibit legislation outlawing polyg-
amy. But the court's reliance on Reynolds may be questioned inasmuch as there has
been no similar history with respect to belief in divine assistance for healing. And
the court's second authority, Pierson, has been, in effect, overruled by statutory
amendment. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
48 See MD. A N. CODE art. 43, § 140 (1957).
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states have reached opposite conclusions, as in the Sandford and
Chenowith cases. However, as was the case in England, where a
statute is held to impose a specific duty to provide medical care there
has been no difficulty in overruling a defense predicated on religious
beliefs.
49
PENNSYLVANIA: A CASE STUDY IN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE
The state of Pennsylvania provides an enlightening example of
how gradual public acceptance of a belief is reflected in the criminal
law. After two early cases in which a defense of religious belief was
rejected and parents were held liable criminally for failure to provide
medical care,5" judicial and legislative acceptance of faith healing, and
more specifically of Christian Science, has so increased that such prose-
cutions probably could not be sustained today against Christian
Scientists.
Pennsylvania has no statute imposing a specific duty upon parents
to provide medical care, such as was involved in People v. Pierson, or'
even a less precisely worded act similar to that in Craig v. State. One
provision of the penal code provides that it is a misdemeanor for a
parent wilfully to omit to furnish "necessary and proper food, clothing
or shelter" for a child,5 and another section makes it a misdemeanor
for a husband or father wilfully to neglect "to maintain his wife or
children." 52 In 1915 the latter act was interpreted in Commonwealth
v. Breth '3 as requiring medical attendance for ill dependent children.54
And one earlier Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Hoffman,55
seemed to reach the same result at common law as Regina v. Hurr y in
England and State v. Chenowith in Indiana. Both Pennsylvania cases
49 See Beck v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 Pac. 495 (1925); cf. Mitchell v.
Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
5 0 Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. County Ct. 56 (1915) ; Commonwealth v. Hoff-
man, 29 Pa. County Ct. 65 (1903).
51 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4727 (1945).
52 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4731 (Supp. 1959).
5344 Pa. County Ct. 56 (1915).
54 Subsequent legislative treatment and judicial construction of this provision indi-
cate that the Breth interpretation probably was erroneous. In the 1939 consolidation
and revision of the criminal laws, the section was included with two others entitled
"Neglect to Maintain Bastard" and "Desertion and Nonsupport!'; the tone of all three
sections speaks to the physical desertion of dependents by a husband or father. And
in 1942 the superior court, construing the provision in question together with PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (Supp. 1959) (desertion and nonsupport), stated that the
latter provides for a support order while the former provides punishment for a de-
serting husband. See Commonwealth v. Widmeyer, 149 Pa. Super. 91, 26 A.2d 125
(1942). Thus, the provisions being mutually limiting, it would seem that the pro-
vision under discussion is directed only to the physical desertion and monetary non-
support by a father rather than to the conscientious refusal of parents to provide
medical aid.
5529 Pa. County Ct. 65 (1903). The case was decided six months after the
passage of the statute cited in Breth but the opinion made no mention of the pro-
vision.
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held that a father could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter for
the death of his son where he did not secure medical treatment but
preferred to rely on a form of spiritual healing alone. 6
In the Hoffman and Breth cases, the courts based their decisions
upon what they conceived to be the public policy of the commonwealth
at that time and relied principally on two expressions of that policy.
First, both courts relied on an earlier civil case in which a Christian
Science church had been denied a charter on the ground that healing
by spiritual means alone was opposed to the general policy of the law
of Pennsylvania relating to the existence and treatment of disease.
6 7
Second, the courts stressed the fact that, as of that time, only qualified
physicians and surgeons were permitted to engage in the practice of
healing."8
Between 1915 and 1956, when the Cornelius indictment was re-
turned, no cases involving the question of religious belief in spiritual
means of healing arose in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, judicial decisions
were handed down granting charters to Christian Science churches,
sanatoriums, and nursing services; and statutes were passed indicating
legislative approval of spiritual means of healing. The question pro-
voked by Cornelius, then, was whether this judicial and legislative
acceptance of Christian Science had so progressed as to change the
public policy of Pennsylvania and destroy the basis of the Hoffman
and Breth decisions.
The Non-Profit Corporation Law of Pennsylvania provides that
a nonprofit corporation may be founded under the provisions of the
act "for any purpose or purposes which are lawful and not injurious to
the community." " There are eighty-three Christian Science churches
in Pennsylvania, most of which have nonprofit corporation charters
based on judicial decrees that their form of worship is lawful and not
injurious to the community.60 More important, both the sanatorium in
56 Neither case involved a Christian Scientist. The headnote of the Hoffman
case states that the defendant "called in the elders of a Christian Scientist Church,
who prayed over the child and anointed it with oil . . . ." However, the text of
the case does not suggest that the defendant was a Christian Scientist and the treat-
ment described is not Christian Science treatment.
5 7 First Church of Christ, Scientist, 205 Pa. 543 (1903). See also Application of
First Church of Christ, Scientist, 6 Pa. Dist. 745 (C.P. 1897).
68 In addition, the illness involved in Hoffman was scarlet fever and the court
there dwelt on the contagious nature of the disease.
59 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §2851-201 (1958).
60 The church of which the defendants were members had received such a charter
under the Non-Profit Corporation Law. See First Church of Christ, Scientist,
Swarthrnore, Petition for Charter, No. 140, March Term, 1924, Delaware County
(Pa.) C.P., April 11, 1924. The articles of incorporation declared that: "Said cor-
poration is formed for the support of public worship of God in accordance with the
tenets of the Christian Science faith and the Manual of The Mother Church, The
First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, Massachusetts."
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which the Cornelius child was placed 61 and an organization known as
the Philadelphia Nursing Service for Christian Scientists0 2 had re-
ceived charters based on such decrees, indicating that not only the form
of worship but also the precise form of healing treatment prescribed by
Christian Science had been judicially declared "lawful and not in-
jurious to the community." 63 These decrees are a natural concomitant
of the broad principle of law that the right of conscience " 'is simply a
right to worship the Supreme Being according to the dictates of the
heart; to adopt any creed or hold any opinion whatever, or to support
any religion; and to do, or forbear to do, any act for conscience sake,
the doing or forbearing of which is not prejudicial to the public
weal.' " 64
61 See In the Matter of the Application for the Incorporation of "The Philadel-
phia Sanatorium, Inc.," No. 4336, Dec. Term 1947, Philadelphia County (Pa.) C.P.
No. 4, April 12, 1948. The master's report pointed out that "the treatment patients
will receive is the Christian Science treatment given by registered practitioners as
listed in the Christian Science Journal, and by Christian Science nurses ....
They must show their ability to give prayerful healing. Medical doctors will not be
in attendance in the sanatorium, but there will be in attendance nurses who are
trained to take care of those who are not able to take care of themselves ....
Neither homeopath or allopath medical treatment will be given."
62 See In the Matter of the Incorporation of the "Philadelphia Nursing Service
for Christian Scientists, Inc.," No. 5244, Dec. Term 1947, Philadelphia Co. (Pa.)
C.P. No. 5, July 15, 1948.
63 How this judicial declaration that Christian Science healing practices are
"lawful and not injurious to the community" squares with PA. STAT. Awx. tit. 11,
§§ 243, 250, 252 (1939) (Juvenile Court Act), is a difficult problem. Section 243
defines a "neglected child," in part, as one whose parent "neglects or refuses to
provide . . . necessary medical or surgical care," and § 250 authorizes the court to
make such orders as shall be necessary for the welfare of the child, including orders
as to custody. Section 252 provides that "the court shall place a child, as far as
possible, under the care, guidance and control of persons have [sic] the same re-
ligious belief as the parents of the child . . . and shall, as far as possible, provide,
in making orders of placement, that the care, guidance and control of the child shall
be as nearly as possible that which should have been given by his or her parents
. ... " Should a child of Christian Science parents be "neglected" in other than
medical matters, the statutory directive as to custody seems clear: § 252 would be
controlling and the child should be placed with Christian Scientist parents. But
should a child be "neglected" as to medical care, the court would be faced with the
conflict between the § 243 definition and judicial orders declaring Christian Science
healing practices "not injurious"; complicating the conflict would be the other legis-
lative recognitions of Christian Science, discussed at notes 65-72 infra and accompany-
ing text. A possible resolution of this conflict would reserve the transferral-of-custody
remedy for cases in which the child presents a danger to the health of the community.
Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.12(e) (Supp. 1959) and discussion at text
accompanying note 67 infra. Note also that the removal of a child from its parents
-an affirmative act by the state for the welfare of both child and community-is a
matter quite different from the punishment of Christian Scientist parents after their
child's death-an essentially negative act as concerns the dead child and any danger
which he had represented to the community during his illness.
64 Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848) ; compare PA. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 3: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God accord-
ing to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend,
erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his con-
sent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
establishment or modes of worship."
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The granting of charters to Christian Science churches, sana-
toriums, and nursing services indicates judicial acceptance of the
purposes of such institutions and, impliedly, the right of the individual
to utilize such services, at least for himself. Not so clearly implied is
public acceptance and approval of the right of a parent to choose
spiritual means of healing for his child. A greater indication of the
acceptance of such doctrines in the latter area is found in legislative
action. At the time of the Cornelius indictment, the legislature had
prescribed a program of required medical and dental examinations for
school age children. 5 The act further provided that recommendations
as to medical, surgical, or dental care should be forwarded by the school
authorities to the family physician or dentist and to the parent or
guardian of the child, who was then obligated to notify the school of
the action taken with respect to the recommendations.66 However, a
specific exception was made to these comprehensive requirements where
the parent objected to examinations or treatment on religious grounds,
provided that the objection did not create a "present substantial
menace" to the health of others. 7
In the law governing adoption the Pennsylvania legislature has
further indicated its approval and acceptance of spiritual means of
healing. The adoption law prescribes the procedures and conditions
for the adoption of children and provides that "whenever possible, the
petitioners shall be of the same religious faith as the natural parents of
the child to be adopted. No person shall be denied the benefits of this
act because of a religious belief in the use of spiritual means or prayer
for healing .. ," 6 The only reasonable implication of this language
is that parents of an adopted child may practice spiritual means for
healing their child. And if adoptive parents may employ spiritual
means or prayer for the treatment of their adoptive child, it seems clear
that natural parents have the same right.
The Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955 authorizes the
issuance of a marriage license without the medical examination and
65 Pa. Laws 1949, No. 14, §§ 1401-38.
66The act also provided for public assistance for medical, dental, or surgical
care which the parent was unable to supply.
67 Pa. Laws 1949, No. 30, § 1408. "This . . . article shall not be construed to
compel any person to submit to any medical or dental examination or treatment . . .
when such person, or the parent, or guardian of any such person objects to such
examination or treatment on religious grounds, or to permit any discrimination against
such person on account of such objections: Provided, that exemption from medical
or dental examination shall not be granted if the Secretary of Health finds that facts
exist under which the exemption constitutes a present substantial menace to the
health of other persons exposed to contact with the unexamined person." This pro-
vision was reenacted without significant change in 1957 when the legislature revised
certain aspects of the school health examination program. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24,
§ 14-1419 (Supp. 1959).
6 8 PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 1, § 1(d) (Supp. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
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laboratory tests normally required, if the examination and tests "are
contrary to the tenets or practices of the religious creed of which the
applicant is an adherent, and . . . the public health and welfare will
not be injuriously affected thereby." "' Pursuant to a similar prede-
cessor provision, Pennsylvania courts have waived the premarital ex-
amination for members of the Christian Science faith.7"
Still further indications of the legislature's approval of spiritual
means of healing as a healing art are found in the statutes governing
the practice of medicine and the nursing profession. The Medical
Practice Act, while defining "healing art" as "the science of diagnosis
and treatment in any manner whatsoever of disease," 71 specifically
exempts healing by spiritual means from the regulations governing the
licensed practice of medicine and surgery.7" Likewise, the Chiropractic
Registration Act does not apply "to any person who, as an adherent of
a well recognized religion which uses spiritual means of prayer for
healing, practices the healing art in accordance with its teachings." '3
And the Professional Nursing Law specifies that it does not prohibit
"care of the sick, with or without compensation or personal profit,
when done in connection with the practice of the religious tenets of
any church by adherents thereof." " Thus, under the least permissive
reading of these statutes, healing by spiritual means is certainly recog-
nized and not prohibited.
Not only the legislature but also various private groups have ac-
cepted Christian Science as a permissible means of healing. Numerous
accident and health insurance companies in the United States, Canada,
and other countries now recognize Christian Science care and treat-
ment by paying the expenses incurred for the service afforded by
Christian Science practitioners and nursing homes. Furthermore,
money paid for the services- of Christian Science practitioners and
nursing care stands on an equal footing with medical expenses so far
as deductibility under the federal income tax laws is concerned. 75
As a result of the judicial, legislative, and public recognition and
acceptance of Christian Science and its healing methods, it is unlikely
69 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.12(e) (Supp. 1959).
70 It re Application of Dollie L. Riggs and David R. Jones for a License to
Marry, Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, June 29, 1956; In re Application of
Mildred Shields and Thomas Holmes, Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, M.L.
54416 Series Two.
71 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 401(d) (1959). (Emphasis added.) PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 401(c) (1959). Almost identical definitions of "healing art" and
"medicine and surgery" are found in the Statutory Construction Act. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, §§601(49), (63) (1952).
73 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 623 (1959).
74 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 214(6) (1959).
75 3 CCH 1943 STAND. FED. TAx RF,. 6175.
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that a conviction could have been had in the Cornelius case and doubt
was cast even upon the desirability of continuing the prosecution.
These doubts evidently were persuasive in the mind of the prosecutor.
Citing the "present day legislative acts" recognizing healing by
spiritual means and noting that "the disease of diabetes did not subject
the public to any danger," he moved to nolle prosequi the indictment.
The court, also persuaded, granted the prosecutor's motion.
7
1
As a result of the disposition of the Cornelius case, the legality of a
parent's exclusive reliance upon spiritual means for the healing of his
child seems to be confirmed. Commonwealth v. Hoffman and Com-
monwealth v. Breth can no longer be said to represent the law of
Pennsylvania. They are based on premises as to the public policy of
the commonwealth which are no longer valid-if indeed they ever
were. With the possible exception of cases involving contagious
diseases, a parent's decision to forego medical remedies and to employ
spiritual means of healing-where that decision is based on a sincere
belief in a religious tenet of a denomination whose beliefs and prac-
tices have been determined both legislatively and judicially to be lawful
and not injurious to the community-will no longer subject him to
criminal penalty if the healing be unsuccessful.
76 Commonwealth v. Cornelius, No. 105, April Sessions, 1956, Philadelphia
County (Pa.) Quar. Sess., Nov. 5, 1958. "[W]hile a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter may, under some circumstances be predicated upon death attributable
to the failure to provide medical care, the character of the ailment, the good faith of
the parent is of supreme importance. If the failure to provide medical care is the
result of religious tenet or a sincere belief in the inefficacy of medical treatment there
may be no criminal responsibility under the law." Verbal opinion of Reimel, J.
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